Fault Management Architectures and the Challenges of Providing Software Assurance by Whitman, Gerek et al.
Fault Management Architectures and 
the Challenges of Providing Software 
Assurance 
Presented to the 31st Space Symposium 
Date: 4/14/2015 
Presenter:  Rhonda Fitz (MPL) 
Primary Author:  Shirley Savarino (TASC) 
Co-Authors:  Lorraine Fesq (JPL/Caltech), 
      Gerek Whitman (TASC) 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20150008250 2019-08-31T10:40:36+00:00Z
Table of Contents 
• Introduction to NASA IV&V 
• IV&V Philosophy and Methodology 
• Challenges with FM and the FM Handbook 
• FM Architectures SARP Initiative 
• FM Assurance Statements 
• Conclusions 
2 
NASA IV&V Facility 
NPR 7150.2, NASA Software Engineering Requirements 
The program manager shall ensure that software IV&V is performed 
on the following categories of projects: 
– Category 1 
– Category 2 that have Class A or Class B payload risk 
classification 
– Projects specifically selected by NASA Chief of Safety and 
Mission Assurance 
 
IV&V = Independent Verification and Validation [of Software] 
Independence: 
– Technical Independence 
– Managerial Independence 
– Financial Independence 
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NPR 7120.5E defines Categories; NPR 8705.4 defines classification of payload risk 
IV&V Methodology 
Criticality analysis assesses likelihood and 
impact of failed behaviors 
• Plotted on a risk matrix 
• Establish priorities and focus for analysis 
• Generally, FM is high criticality 
 
The goal of each IV&V project is to assure 
mission success by assuring that the 
critical software (mission-critical and/or 
safety-critical): 
• Does what it is supposed to do 
• Does not do what it is not supposed to do 
• Performs appropriately under adverse 
conditions 
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IV&V assures mission success by validating and verifying critical software. 
Assurance Strategy 
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Challenges with Fault Management 
• Increasing FM complexity goes beyond traditional fault protection with 
the goal of not only averting catastrophe, but also maintaining capability 
 
• FM systems, many times architected as reactive components 
embedded within the overall software system, must be validated 
against higher-level system capability requirements 
 
• Off-nominal conditions are challenging to identify comprehensively, 
understand completely, and ascertain the optimal response to mitigate 
risk 
 
• Continuous improvement for software assurance practices is attained 
by leveraging the IV&V FM Community of Interest to identify FM 
architecture commonalities/strategies across NASA missions 
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FM Handbook 
Plans:  Renewed effort to develop “chapter” for each mission type, to 
be incorporated into NASA FM Handbook 
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Goal 
•Ameliorate schedule/cost/predictability 
challenges of testing/operating FM systems 
•Improve reliability and safety of NASA’s 
flight and ground systems 
•Coalesce the FM field 
Scope 
• Outline scoped to address needs of Agency 
– crewed and robotic missions 
• Robotic emphasis in Version 1, due to SMD 
co-funding 
• Suggested use as “companion” to SE 
Handbook 
Draft 1 Released July 2011  
1113 comments (NTSPO record) 
Current Status:  Draft 2 released 4/9/12. 
Lesson Learned:  Diverse FM views across NASA.  
Comments cannot be dispositioned by one person or 
one Center – requires discussions/consensus among 
people in the discipline, across the Agency 
Take 2:  Developing a Deep Space FM Robotic Guidebook 
FM Architectures SARP Initiative 
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Survey Methodology 
IV&V Analyst Subject Matter Experts were surveyed from each of eight chosen 
projects with a variety of mission types, developers, and relative complexity 
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Name Mission Type 
Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) Deep Space Robotic 
International Space Station (ISS) Human Spaceflight 
James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Deep Space Robotic 
Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Exploration Flight Test 1 (MPCV EFT-1) Human Spaceflight 
Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) Earth Orbiter 
Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) Earth Orbiter 
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite R-Series (GOES-R) Earth Orbiter 
Solar Probe Plus (SPP) Deep Space Robotic 
Architecture Survey Questions 
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 Category Description 
Structure 
7 questions 
Obtain a high level view of each architecture, and provide insight into size, complexity, and scale. 
• Address the structure and organization of the FM architecture.   
• Characteristics such as centralization or distribution, tiers of operation, interdependency, 
modifiability, and implementation within the overall flight software are addressed. 
Concept 
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Addresses the design process and major design ideas and themes of the FM architecture.   
• Considerations such as fault analysis, automation, mission phases, fault definition, redundancy, 
and fail-safe/fail-operational modes are addressed.   
• Establish a broad view of how the FM system is intended to accomplish its objectives, and why it is 
designed and structured in the way it is. 
Implementation 
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Technical implementation detail about how the FM architecture was built and how it works.  
• Number of monitors and responses, false positives and persistence, fault isolation, simultaneous 
responses, and subsystem inter-communication are examples of the low-level characteristics 
covered by this section.   
• Capabilities that some architectures have but others do not are important to uncover in order to 
help categorize and label the architectures as well as reveal potential strengths and limitations of 
various FM architectures. 
Other Questions 
5 questions 
• This was the catch-all section for things the other questions may not have entirely covered 
• This section contained questions involving heritage and mission parameters in order to provide 
some additional context to frame the rest of the responses.   
IV&V Survey Questions 
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Survey: IV&V Analysis Questions 
• What were the key drivers to IV&V on this project? 
• What were the critical errors that IV&V was focused on assuring against? 
• What other assurance strategies were involved in IV&Ving this project? 
• What kinds of artifacts did you get from the developer to use in the analysis, and how 
did the types of artifacts you received affect your analysis? 
• Were there types of artifacts you did not receive or the developer did not generate 
that would have made analysis easier/faster/more complete? 
• What kinds of technical reference(s) did you generate during your analysis? 
• If the FM system was inherited or standardized, how did this influence your analysis? 
• What language was used to write the FSW?  How did this choice in language make 
analysis easier/more difficult? 
• What was the highest benefit analysis?  In retrospect, were there things you or the 
IV&V team would or should have done differently? 
Sample FM Assurance Statements 
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Typical Assurance Objectives or Conclusions Source 
Mission Type 
3Qs 
Mapping 
Concept Phase 
"The Hazards Report documents all known software-based hazard causes, contributors, and 
controls." 
Deep Space 
Robotic 
Q3 
Requirements Phase 
"The system fault management requirements are of high quality and are consistent with 
acquirer needs as they relate to the system’s software." 
Deep Space 
Robotic 
Q1 
Design Phase 
"There are no monitor-response collisions – there are no concurrent responses that could 
cause harm or detrimental behaviors to the vehicle between any lower or higher level 
responses." 
Deep Space 
Robotic 
Q2 
Implementation Phase 
"The fault management behaviors needed for the system during flight operations are correctly 
and completely being represented in the algorithms and fully satisfied in the implementation." 
Earth Orbiter Q1 
Integration & Test Phase 
"The set of tests was comprehensive with regard to the Fault Management Design Document 
algorithms." 
Human 
Spaceflight 
Q1 
Operations & Maintenance Phase 
"The added tests strengthened the developer’s testing of the Power Management software 
and provided additional assurance that the software will perform as expected." 
Human 
Spaceflight 
Q1 
Conclusions 
• Completed an in-depth survey of several FM architectures that serve to 
structure the safety- and mission-critical software  
 
• The NASA IV&V Program has found that FM systems are often ranked high 
in the risk-based assessment of criticality 
 
• The Assurance Strategies that focus IV&V analysis provide value by 
identifying and mitigating risks across a variety of mission types, including 
Earth orbiters, human spaceflight, and deep space robotic missions 
 
• Results of these efforts will feed into the updated NASA FM Handbook 
providing dissemination across NASA, other agencies and the space 
community 
 
• Potential future efforts will be to extend our efforts to survey additional 
spaceflight projects; investigate projects within other domains such as 
launch vehicles, ground systems, or manned and unmanned aeronautics 
systems; as well as collaborate with OSMA and FM experts across the 
NASA agency 
13 
References & Contacts 
References: 
• NASA IV&V Website 
• Fault Management Handbook (NASA-HDBK-1002) Draft 2 
• Fault Management NASA Engineering Network 
• IV&V Technical Framework (IVV 09-1) Version O 
 
Contact Information: 
Rhonda Fitz – rhonda.s.fitz@ivv.nasa.gov 
Shirley Savarino – shirley.savarino@tasc.com 
Lorraine Fesq – lorraine.m.fesq@jpl.nasa.gov 
Gerek Whitman – gerek.whitman@tasc.com 
14 
